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Social cognitionWe investigated the development of theory of mind use through
eye-tracking in children (9–13 years old, n = 14), adolescents (14–
17.9 years old, n = 28), and adults (19–29 years old, n = 23).
Participants performed a computerized task in which a director
instructed them to move objects placed on a set of shelves. Some
of the objects were blocked off from the director’s point of view;
therefore, participants needed to take into consideration the direc-
tor’s ignorance of these objects when following the director’s
instructions. In a control condition, participants performed the
same task in the absence of the director and were told that the
instructions would refer only to items in slots without a back
panel, controlling for general cognitive demands of the task.
Participants also performed two inhibitory control tasks. We repli-
cated previous findings, namely that in the director-present condi-
tion, but not in the control condition, children and adolescents
made more errors than adults, suggesting that theory of mind
use improves between adolescence and adulthood. Inhibitory con-
trol partly accounted for errors on the director task, indicating that
it is a factor of developmental change in perspective taking. Eye-
tracking data revealed early eye gaze differences between trials
where the director’s perspective was taken into account and those
where it was not. Once differences in accuracy rates were consid-
ered, all age groups engaged in the same kind of online processing
during perspective taking but differed in how often they engagedng ado-
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Fig. 1. Instruction screens used to explain the task
point of view, and the set of shelves on the right is
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Over the last couple of decades, cognitive neuroscience research has shown that brain areas
involved in theory of mind (the ‘‘social brain”)—our ability to attribute the beliefs, thoughts, desires,
intentions, and feelings of others—undergo changes not only during childhood but also during adoles-
cence (Burnett, Sebastian, Cohen Kadosh, & Blakemore, 2011). A substantial number of studies have
now provided evidence for structural and functional changes in the social brain during childhood
and adolescence. In addition, there is a body of evidence that theory of mind (ToM) is applied more
robustly or accurately with age through middle childhood (Devine & Hughes, 2013; Epley,
Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Lecce, Bianco, Devine, Hughes, & Banerjee, 2014; Surtees & Apperly,
2012; Wang, Ali, Frisson, & Apperly, in press) and adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore,
2010; Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy, & Kliegel, 2013). Previous studies have shown that children’s
performance on paradigms such as false-belief tasks reaches ceiling at around the age of 5 years
(Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The question arises as to what fac-
tors affect older children and adolescents’ successful application of such abilities.
The Director paradigm has been used to investigate the ability to take the perspective of another
individual into account in a communicative context (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008;
Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; Fett et al., 2014; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, &
Barr, 2003). In these studies, the participant interacts with another agent (a ‘‘director”) to act on a
set of objects (Director paradigm; Fig. 1). Crucially, some of the objects are blocked off from the direc-
tor’s point of view and are visible only to the participant. Thus, when the director talks about an object
(e.g., ‘‘the large ball”; Fig. 2), the participant should ignore any object that is not visible to the director
and instead select a referent from what is in the ‘‘common ground,” that is, what is visible to both the
participant and the director. This paradigm requires the participant to infer the speaker’s referential
intention (a mental state) based on beliefs that differ from his or her own due to the speaker’s igno-
rance of the presence of an object that would be a potential referent for the instruction given. For
example, in the setup shown in Fig. 2, the participant, but not the director, sees a third ball that best
fits the description ‘‘the large ball” (the basketball) and needs to discount it as the intended referent
because the director does not know about that ball.
The Director paradigm is useful for the study of the development of the social brain because it can
be used to measure the application of aspects of ToM without asking participants to make an explicitto participants. The set of shelves on the left is shown from the participant’s
shown from the director’s point of view.
u, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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Fig. 2. Stimuli of the perspective-taking task. (A and B) Director condition. The participant heard the instruction ‘‘Move the
large ball up” from the director. In an Experimental trial (A), if the participant did not take the director’s perspective into
account, he or she would move the basketball instead of the football, which is the second largest and can be seen by both the
participant and the director. In a Control trial (B), the distractor is replaced by an irrelevant object. (C and D) No-Director
condition. The participant is told that instructions do not refer to items in slots with a gray background; therefore, the correct
responses are the same as in the Director condition.
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less than ceiling performance on the Director paradigm (Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; Keysar et al.,
2000), it is well suited for exploring how ToM abilities develop across childhood and adolescence.
Early visual world eye-tracking studies using the Director paradigm demonstrated that adult par-
ticipants are not able to ignore objects to which they have privileged visual access and that they are
less accurate in choosing the object that is visually available to both participants and the director com-
pared with control conditions (Epley et al., 2004; Keysar et al., 2000, 2003). Keysar and colleagues
explained these results by suggesting that participants have an initial bias to take an egocentric per-
spective and that their initial interpretation of the instruction is later adjusted according to the speak-
er’s knowledge state by a second process that corrects any manifest errors.
In contrast, studies using very similar paradigms have found evidence that participants are able to
integrate information about the speaker’s beliefs immediately (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003;
Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008). This is comparable to findings that individuals may rapidly and
automatically compute what other people see (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley
Scott, 2010). It seems clear that adults are able to integrate information to some extent about what
their interlocutor knows from the earliest stages of referential language processing even though they
are liable to attend to objects that are not known to the speaker (Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011).
Among adults, performance on perspective-taking tasks has been shown to be affected by factors such
as the nature of the verbal stimulus (Barr, 2008), the extent to which the interaction offers information
about the interlocutor’s mental state (Brown-Schmidt, 2009a), cultural background (Wu & Keysar,
2007), inhibitory control (Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Nilsen & Graham, 2009), and mood (Converse,
Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008).
Dumontheil and colleagues (2010) tested 7- to 27-year-old female participants’ performance using
a computerized version of Keysar and colleagues’ (2000) Director task. Participants were presented
with a 4  4 grid that contained various objects in different slots. A director (an avatar) gave partici-
pants instructions about which objects to move and where to move them. As in the original design,
some of the slots on the shelves were occluded so that the director could not see what was present
on those shelves. The study also included a No-Director condition where participants performed the
same task in the absence of a director. In this condition, they were told that the instructions would
not refer to items in slots with a gray background. According to Dumontheil and colleagues (2010),
the difference between the two conditions is that whereas only executive function processes are
required for participants to perform well on the task in the No-Director condition, both ToM processes
and executive function processes are required in the Director condition because participants need to
take someone else’s perspective into account in order to perform well.
Dumontheil and colleagues (2010) found that error rates were higher in the late adolescent group
(14- to 17-year-olds) than in the adult group in the Director condition but that they did not differPlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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functions only. This suggests that late adolescents differ from adults in their application of ToM infer-
ence when controlling for certain executive function demands.
In contrast to the error rates, Dumontheil and colleagues (2010) reported that reaction times on the
critical trials in the Director condition remained the same across all age groups. Furthermore, they
found that reaction times were longer in the No-Director condition than in the Director condition.
According to the authors, this difference suggests that participants approach the Director task in a
way that is more efficient than just applying an arbitrary rule. They proposed that the difference in
accuracy between the late adolescent and adult groups might stem not from how efficiently or rapidly
they can make referential inferences but rather from their propensity to integrate information about
the speaker’s beliefs in making those inferences. These suggestions point to a response to the question
raised above as to what factors are responsible for the better application of ToM abilities during this
stage of development. The current study used visual world eye-tracking measures on a variant of the
Director task employed by Dumontheil and colleagues (2010).
It is widely accepted that eye fixations can indicate howwe process information during spoken lan-
guage comprehension (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy,
1995). By measuring when participants fixate their gaze on an object, we can identify which object
they are considering as a possible referent at a given point in time. Although eye-tracking has previ-
ously been used in variants of the Director task, samples of these studies have been limited to either
adults (Keysar et al., 2003; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Wu & Keysar, 2007) or younger children (5- and
6-year-olds in Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; 4- to 12-year-olds in Epley et al., 2004). The current study
afforded an opportunity to examine and compare how children, adolescents, and adults apply ToM
in real time through monitoring their eye gaze while they were performing the task. Specifically,
the aim was to explore the time course of the decision process that yields both correct and incorrect
responses in participants.
Furthermore, the current study also aimed to understand whether ongoing development of exec-
utive function processes, specifically inhibition, plays a role in perspective taking. Previous studies
have found a correlation between inhibition and the application of ToM inference in children (3-
and 4-year-olds in Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; 4- to 10-year-olds in Hansen Lagattuta, Sayfan,
& Harvey, 2014; 4- to 9-year-olds in Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010; 2- to 5-year-olds in
Nilsen & Graham, 2009) and in adults (Brown-Schmidt, 2009b). A meta-analysis of 100 studies with
3- to 6-year-olds by Devine and Hughes (2014) highlighted the association between executive func-
tion and ToM. Inhibitory control, like other executive skills, is still maturing during adolescence
(Leon-Carrion, García-Orza, & Pérez-Santamaría, 2004; Luna, Padmanabhan, & Hearn, 2011). A study
by Vetter and colleagues (2013) found that inhibitory control, as measured with an anti-saccade task,
predicted age-related variance in affective ToM during adolescence. No other study, however, has
looked at the role of inhibitory control in adolescents’ ability to inhibit one’s perspective and consider
someone else’s perspective. Therefore, we measured participants’ inhibitory control through two vari-
ants of the Go–NoGo task in order to investigate whether individual differences in inhibitory control
can account for their performance on the Director task.
Based on the evidence of ongoing functional development of neural processes related to ToM and
the results of Dumontheil and colleagues (2010), we expected that age-related differences in partici-
pants’ accuracy would be greater in the Director condition than in the No-Director condition. We also
expected to see age-related differences in inhibitory control, which may partially account for partic-
ipants’ performance on the Director task. We measured the extent to which participants considered
the target object relative to the distractor by computing the target advantage score, which is the aver-
age probability of looks at the target object minus the average probability of looks to the distractor
(Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Kronmüller & Barr, 2015). This allowed us to examine and compare how each
age group used ToM to identify the referent.
According to the perspective adjustment model proposed by Keysar and colleagues, participants
have an initial egocentric bias, which is then adjusted, during a second process, to the speaker’s per-
spective. Therefore, this theory predicts that participants will fixate on the distractor first and, if the
second process of adjusting is successful (i.e., on correct trials), then participants will fixate their gaze
on the target object and give a correct response. However, if the second process fails and perspectivePlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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ate on the target, and participants to eventually give an incorrect response. As such, it is predicted that
although both adolescents and adults would fixate on the distractor object initially, demonstrating an
initial egocentric bias, adults would then be more likely to switch to fixating their gaze on the target
object and do so more quickly than adolescents. In other words, both adolescents and adults would
have a smaller target advantage initially, but adults would have a bigger target advantage score than
adolescents in earlier time regions.
Other models of perspective taking found in Hanna and colleagues (2003) and Brown-Schmidt,
Gunlogson, and Tanenhaus (2008) suggest that perspective information is available from the outset
but that the extent to which it is integrated online depends on how sensitive participants are to such
information (Brown-Schmidt, 2012) or on participants’ ability to integrate that information with lin-
guistic and visual contextual information (Hanna et al., 2003). According to these proposals, an incor-
rect response may reflect a simple failure to integrate perspective from the start of a trial. If this is the
case, then patterns of eye gaze may differ from the onset of the critical phase of the instruction
between correct and incorrect trials.Method
Participants
A total of 65 participants took part in this study, constituting three age groups: child (n = 14, 9–
13 years old, M = 11.2 years, SD = 1.2), adolescent (n = 28, 14–17.9 years old, M = 16.2 years,
SD = 1.1), and adult (n = 23, 19–29 years old,M = 23.0, SD = 2.8). The age groups were divided to match
the age groups of Dumontheil and colleagues (2010). Adult participants were recruited from the
University College London (UCL) Psychology participant pool, whereas children and adolescents were
recruited from London schools. All participants were native English speakers. Data from three adults
were excluded due to technical errors. We also excluded data from two adolescents who did not
understand the instructions of the No-Director condition. Verbal ability was measured in all partici-
pants using the vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999). Average verbal IQ scores were 124 (SD = 8.0) for adults, 118 (SD = 6.9) for adoles-
cents, and 123 (SD = 10.2) for children. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant
difference in verbal IQ scores between groups, F(2,57) = 5.97, p = .03. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
comparisons showed that adolescents performed worse than adults (p = .04), but verbal IQ did not sig-
nificantly differ between children and adolescents (p = .22) or between children and adults (p = 1.00).
Parents/guardians of all child and adolescent participants as well as the adult participants were
given information sheets prior to the study. Informed consent was obtained from the parents/
guardians for all child/adolescent participants and from all adult participants. This study was
approved by the UCL research ethics committee.Design
Director task
The current experiment had two within-participant factors: condition (Director or No Director) and
trial type (Control or Experimental). It had one between-participants factor: age group (child, adoles-
cent, or adult). The task design and stimuli were based on a previous study by Dumontheil and
colleagues (2010; see also Apperly et al., 2010). Participants were presented with a visual scene of a
4  4 set of shelves containing eight different objects and were asked to move one of the objects in
each trial.
In the Director condition, a ‘‘director” was shown standing behind the shelves, viewing the shelves
from behind (Fig. 1). Participants were asked to listen to the director’s instructions to move one of the
objects (e.g., ‘‘Move the large ball up”) and respond. Participants were told that they should take the
director’s viewpoint into account when following the director’s instructions. They were told that
objects in slots with a gray background were visible only to them, whereas the other objects couldPlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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(‘‘target”) given the director’s point of view but would refer to another object (‘‘distractor”) if one
assumed participants’ perspective (Fig. 2A). As such, participants needed to take the director’s per-
spective into account in order to respond correctly in an Experimental trial. In Control trials, the dis-
tractor object was replaced by an irrelevant object and the instruction referred to an object that was
visible to both participants and the director (Fig. 2B). In Filler trials, instructions referred to single
objects that were visible to both participants and the director (e.g., the turtle in Fig. 2).
In the No-Director condition, the only difference was that the director was removed from the stim-
uli (Fig. 2C and D). Participants were told that the auditory instructions would refer only to items in
clear slots and not items that were in slots with a gray background.
A total of 48 pairs of shelf configurations were created as Experimental and Control trials. All shelf
configurations depicted eight objects and included either three (Experimental trials) or two (Control
trials) exemplars of the same object that differed in position (top/bottom) or size (large/small). In
Experimental trials, the exemplars were distributed such that the distractor object (the top-most,
bottom-most, smallest, or largest object) was in a slot with a gray background, whereas the target
object (the second top-most, bottom-most, smallest, or largest object) and the third object (‘‘Object
2”) were in a clear slot (Fig. 2A and C). In the Control trials, the distractor was replaced by an irrelevant
object (Fig. 2B and D). The rest of the objects were unique objects distributed among three slots with a
gray background and two clear slots. Another 48 pairs of shelf configurations were created for the Fil-
ler trials, in which the instructions referred to single objects that were in a clear slot. Taken together,
the stimuli were divided such that half were presented in the Director condition and the other half
were presented in the No-Director condition (counterbalanced across participants), and each partici-
pant saw 12 Experimental trials, 12 Control trials, and 24 Filler trials in the Director and No-Director
conditions. The order of stimulus presentation was counterbalanced between participants.
The materials and design of the current study differed from those Dumontheil and colleagues’
(2010) study in three ways. First, we included a greater number of Experimental and Control trials
to increase statistical power and allow eye-tracking data analysis. Second, whereas each shelf config-
uration was used with three successive instructions in Dumontheil and colleagues’ study, a different
shelf configuration was used in each trial in the current study to minimize participants’ learning
strategies. Third, whereas participants needed to pretend to drag the object in the previous study, they
were able to click and drag any object on the grid in the current study.
Inhibitory control tasks
To measure participants’ inhibitory control, we used two different Go–NoGo tasks, both of which
had one within-participant factor trial type (Go or NoGo). The Simple Go–NoGo task was based on
the standard Go–NoGo paradigm (Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). A colored square was pre-
sented on the left or right side of the screen in each trial. Participants needed to indicate which side
of the screen it appeared on if the square was green (a Go trial) and to inhibit their response if the
square was red (a NoGo trial). The Complex Go–NoGo task was identical except that it used yellow
and blue squares and included a 1-back working memory (WM) requirement (see Simmonds et al.,
2008), such that participants needed to indicate on which side of the screen the square was shown
(Go trials) except when a blue square was preceded by a yellow square (NoGo trials).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in one session lasting approximately 45 min. They completed
the various tasks in the following order: (1) the Director task (Director condition and then No-Director
condition), (2) the inhibitory control tasks (Simple Go–NoGo task and then Complex Go–NoGo task),
and (3) the vocabulary subtest of the WASI. Eye movements during the Director task were recorded
using a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker at a sampling rate of 60 Hz. Stimuli for the Director task were pre-
sented using E-Prime 2, and the Go–NoGo tasks were programmed in Cogent (http://www.vislab.
ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html) running in Matlab 7.0 (MathWorks).
Standardized instructions were read to participants prior to the Director task. For the Director con-
dition, participants were told that the director had a different view of the shelves (Fig. 1) and that thePlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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We asked participants to give an example of an object that both they and the director could see as well
as an object that the director could not see to ensure that participants understood the task. For the No-
Director condition, participants were told that the director was no longer present and that instructions
would refer only to items in clear slots, such that they should ignore items in slots with a gray back-
ground when performing the task. The Director condition was always presented prior to the No-
Director condition in order to prevent participants from applying the rule provided in the No-
Director condition (Dumontheil et al., 2010). Participants were presented with two Filler practice trials
before each condition.
In each trial, the visual stimulus and auditory instructions were presented over a period of 2.2 s.
The visual stimulus remained on the screen for another 3.8 s, during which participants responded
by clicking an object and dragging it to a different position. A response was considered correct if
the target object had been selected. Response times (RTs) were measured from the onset of the
display.
In the Go–NoGo tasks, each square was presented for 400 ms, with a 600- to 800-ms jittered fixa-
tion cross intertrial interval (ITI). Participants responded by pressing the left or right key using their
right index or middle finger, respectively (adapted from Watanabe et al., 2002). Participants per-
formed two practice blocks prior to each task; the first practice block presented 10 Go trials to estab-
lish a habitual response, and the second one presented 6 Go trials and 4 NoGo trials. Practice was
repeated if participants made two or more errors. Each participant performed 80 test trials on each
task (25% NoGo).
Data analysis
Behavioral data analyses
All analyses were processed in SPSS and R. Statistical significance was set at p < .05. Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc t-tests were performed to explore significant main effects and interactions further.
Director task. Mixed repeated measures ANOVAs with two within-participant factors (condition and
trial type) and one between-participant factor (age group) were performed on participants’ mean
accuracy (percentage errors) and reaction times (RTs). Data for Filler trials were not analyzed; partic-
ipants made fewer than 2% errors on these trials on average. Because verbal IQ differed among groups,
we conducted an additional mixed repeated measures ANOVA that included verbal IQ as a covariate.
Inhibitory control tasks. For both the Simple and Complex Go–NoGo tasks, mean accuracy (percentage
errors) was calculated for each participant in each trial type (Go or NoGo) and median RT was calcu-
lated for correct Go trials. A 2  3 mixed ANOVA with a within-participant factor trial type (Go or
NoGo) and a between-participant factor age group (child, adolescent, or adult) was performed for each
task. One-way ANOVAs were performed to examine the effect of age group on participants’ RTs in Go
trials in each task.
Association between Director and inhibitory control tasks. Regression analyses were performed to inves-
tigate whether age-related changes in Director task performance were associated with performance
on the inhibitory control tasks. The difference in percentage errors between Director and No-
Director Experimental trials, which is the critical measure of interest, was entered as the dependent
variable. In a first step, age was entered as a continuous variable. In a second step, the four percentage
error measures of the Simple and Complex Go–NoGo trials were entered in a stepwise regression.
Finally, in a third step, IQ was entered to assess whether it accounted for variance associated with
age in this model.
Eye-tracking data analyses
Eye movements were analyzed by computing a target advantage score, which is the average prob-
ability of looks at the target object minus the average probability of looks at the distractor (Kronmüller
& Barr, 2015). A look to the target was defined as a look to the object or the slot in which the objectPlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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a look to the object or the slot in which the object was located. Note that because the distractor was an
irrelevant object in the Control trials, target advantage scores in the Control trials represented the dif-
ference between looks to the target and looks to the irrelevant object.
Target advantage scores were calculated over 50-ms time bins for the figures where 0 ms was the
noun onset. For statistical analyses, the target advantage scores were calculated for five different time
windows (regions) during a trial. The five regions were time-locked to the onset of words in the audi-
tory stimuli. Region 1 was the verb (‘‘move”), Region 2 was the article (‘‘the”), Region 3 was the mod-
ifier (‘‘large”), Region 4 was the critical noun region (‘‘ball”), and Region 5 was the directional
preposition (‘‘up”). Analyses of data in these regions were offset by 200 ms to account for the time
required for planning and launching an eye movement (Hallett, 1978). Data in each region were ana-
lyzed for the Director and No-Director tasks separately. Because we did not have predictions regarding
participants’ eye gaze prior to the modifier (e.g., ‘‘large”), we focused our analyses on data in Regions 3
to 5 only.
First, 2 (Condition)  2 (Trial Type)  3 (Age Group) mixed ANOVAs were performed on correct tri-
als for each region. Data from 2 participants in the child group were excluded from this analysis
because they did not have enough correct trials. Second, 2 (Accuracy)  3 (Age Group) mixed ANOVAs
were performed separately for correct and incorrect Director Experimental trials, the key trials of
interest, for each region. Because children and adolescents did not have many correct trials (in some
cases only one or two), and some adults did not have any incorrect trials, some participants (5 chil-
dren, 5 adolescents, and 9 adults) needed to be omitted from this analysis due to the lack of eye gaze
data. Given the clear differences in accuracy between groups, we believe that it was not suitable to
combine correct and incorrect trials in the analysis. However, interested readers can find the results
of such analyses in the online supplementary material.Results
Behavioral results
Director task
Accuracy. Fig. 3 shows participants’ percentage error as a function of age group, and Table 1 shows the
results of the statistical analysis. There were significant main effects of condition (gp2 = .591), trial type
(gp2 = .675), and age group (gp2 = .220), which were qualified by significant Age Group  Trial Type
and Age Group  Condition two-way interactions and a significant three-way interactionFig. 3. Percentage errors (means + standard errors) in the Director task for each age group. **p < .01; ***p 6 .001.
Please cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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Table 1
Omnibus repeated measures ANOVA of percentage errors in Director
task.
df F
Omnibus ANOVA
Age group 2, 57 8.06**
Condition 1, 57 82.27**
Trial type 1, 57 118.49**
Age Group  Condition 2, 57 2.27
Age Group  Trial Type 2, 57 6.65**
Condition  Trial Type 1, 57 70.73**
Age Group  Condition  Trial Type 2, 57 4.73*
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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trials separately. No significant effects were found in the Control trials (all ps > .08). In contrast, in
Experimental trials there was a main effect of condition, F(1,57) = 83.57, p < .001, gp2 = .595, a main
effect of age group, F(2,57) = 8.10, p = .001, gp2 = .221, and a significant interaction between condition
and age group, F(2,57) = 3.67, p = .032, gp2 = .114. Follow-up analysis examining Experimental trials in
the Director and No-Director tasks separately revealed a significant effect of age group in Director
Experimental trials, F(2,57) = 8.10, p = .001, gp2 = .221, but not in No-Director Experimental trials, F
(2,57) = 1.85, p = .167. Follow-up t-tests for the Director Experimental trials showed that both the
child and adolescent groups made significantly more errors than the adult group (child: t(32) =
3.73, p = .001, d = 1.321; adolescent: t(44) = 2.94, p = .005, d = 0.887), but there was no difference
between the child and adolescent groups, t(38) = 1.36, p = .183.
Because the age groups significantly differed in terms of their verbal IQ, we repeated the 2  2  3
mixed repeated measures ANOVA with standardized IQ (z-score) as a covariate. The same main effects
and interactions were found.
To summarize, children and adolescents made more errors than adults only in the Director Exper-
imental trials, which required taking the perspective of the director into account, in contrast to the
rule-based control condition (No-Director Experimental trials). This replicated the behavioral results
reported in Dumontheil and colleagues (2010).
Reaction time. Analysis of RT showed that children responded more slowly than the adolescents and
adults in all trial types except for the Director Experimental trials, which showed no difference among
age groups (see supplementary material for analyses). These results are also in line with those
reported in Dumontheil and colleagues (2010).
Inhibitory control tasks
Simple Go–NoGo. The repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant main effects of trial type, F
(1,57) = 50.34, p < .001, gp2 = .469, and age group, F(2,57) = 5.29, p = .008, gp2 = .156 (Fig. 4). More errors
were made in NoGo trials than in Go trials and the child group made more errors than the adolescents
(p = .027) and adults (ps < .03), who did not differ (p = 1.00). The interaction between age group and
trial type was not significant (p > .20).
Complex Go–NoGo. We found significant main effects of trial type, F(1,57) = 108.87, p < .001, gp2 = .656,
and age group, F(2,57) = 11.44, p < .001, gp2 = .286, in the Complex Go–NoGo task and no interaction
between these factors (p > .10) (Fig. 4). Here, the child and adolescent groups did not differ (p > .10),
but they both made more errors than the adult group (ps < .01).
Simple and Complex Go RT. Analyses of median RT in correct Go trials revealed that, in both the Simple
and Complex Go–NoGo tasks, the child group was significantly slower than the adolescent and adult
groups, who did not differ from each other (see supplementary material for RT analyses).Please cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
lescence: An eye-tracking study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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Fig. 4. Percentage errors (means + standard errors) in Go and NoGo trials in the Simple and Complex inhibitory control tasks for
each age group. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p 6 .001.
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nificantly accounted for 14.4% of variance in the difference in percentage error between Director and
No-Director Experimental trials (Table 2). Inhibitory control, as measured by the Simple NoGo per-
centage error, accounted for an additional 9.2% of variance, with more errors on Simple NoGo trials
predicting more errors in Director versus No-Director Experimental trials. The other three measures
of Go–NoGo percentage error were not significant predictors (all bs < .124 and ps > .370). The effect
of age was still significant in the second model, suggesting partially independent effects of age and
inhibitory control. Finally, entering verbal IQ as an additional regressor did not improve the model,
and both the independent effects of age and Simple NoGo percentage error remained significant
(Table 2).Eye-tracking results
Table 3 shows mean target advantage scores across conditions, and Table 4 shows the results of the
statistical analyses. Fig. 5A–D show plots of average target advantage over time. No significant effects
were found in Region 3 (‘‘large”) (all ps > .20). Main effects of condition and trial type were marginal in
Region 4 (‘‘ball”) (ps < .10) and were significant in Region 5 (‘‘up”) (condition: gp2 = .042; trial type:
gp2 = .234). The Condition  Trial Type interaction was significant in both Region 4 (gp2 = .031) andTable 2
Multiple regression analyses of Director task performance.
b t p
Model 1 R2 = 14.4%; F(1,57) = 9.60, p = .003 (Constant)
Age .380
5.421
3.099
.000
.003
Model 2 R2 = 23.6%; F(2,56) = 8.64, p = .001
DR2 = 9.2%; F(1,56) = 6.72, p = .012
(Constant)
Age
Simple NoGo
.298
.314
5.071
2.464
2.591
.000
.017
.012
Model 3 R2 = 25%; F(3,55) = 6.11, p = .001
DR2 = 1.5%; F(1,55) = 1.09, p = .302
(Constant)
Age
Simple NoGo
Verbal IQ
.287
.311
.122
3.358
2.360
2.575
1.043
.001
.022
.013
.302
Note. The difference in percentage error between Director and No-Director Experimental trials was entered as the dependent
variable.
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Table 3
Mean target advantage scores (and standard errors) for correct trials in each condition for each region.
Condition and trial type Region 3 ‘‘large” Region 4 ‘‘ball” Region 5 ‘‘up”
Child
Director Control 0.08 (.02) 0.12 (.02) 0.02 (.04)
Director Experimental 0.00 (.03) 0.04 (.03) 0.07 (.07)
No-Director Control 0.04 (.02) 0.08 (.02) 0.05 (.03)
No-Director Experimental 0.03 (.04) 0.15 (.04) 0.28 (.06)
Adolescent
Director Control 0.03 (.02) 0.09 (.02) 0.00 (.02)
Director Experimental 0.03 (.02) 0.07 (.04) 0.11 (.05)
No-Director Control 0.03 (.01) 0.10 (.02) 0.01 (.02)
No-Director Experimental 0.05 (.02) 0.16 (.02) 0.24 (.03)
Adult
Director Control 0.05 (.02) 0.09 (.02) 0.03 (.02)
Director Experimental 0.01 (.03) 0.12 (.03) 0.15 (.05)
No-Director Control 0.02 (.02) 0.07 (.02) 0.01 (.03)
No-Director Experimental 0.01 (.03) 0.13 (.04) 0.24 (.05)
Table 4
Omnibus repeated measures ANOVA of target advantage for correct trials in each region.
df Region 3 ‘‘large” Region 4 ‘‘ball” Region 5 ‘‘up”
Omnibus ANOVA
Age group 2, 55 0.44 0.13 0.20
Condition 1, 55 0.00 3.73^ 8.52**
Trial type 1, 55 0.77 3.29^ 81.58**
Age Group  Condition 2, 55 0.74 1.51 0.64
Age Group  Trial Type 2, 55 1.14 1.07 1.05
Condition  Trial Type 1, 55 1.43 11.45** 8.12**
Age Group  Condition  Trial Type 2, 55 0.24 1.96 0.42
^ p < .1.
** p < .01.
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(ps > .30), whereas the target advantage in Experimental trials was significantly smaller in the No-
Director task than in the Director task in both Region 4, F(1,57) = 8.22, p < .01, gp2 = .055, and Region
5, F(1,57) = 10.84, p = .002, gp2 = .090. No significant effects involving age group were observed in
any of the regions (all ps > .15).
To summarize, in correct trials, participants showed a smaller target advantage in No-Director
Experimental trials than in Director Experimental trials on hearing the noun. Crucially, their eye
movement patterns did not vary across age groups in any of the regions.
We conducted additional analyses to examine the differences in eye gaze between correct and
incorrect Director Experimental trials, the key trials of interest in the Director paradigm (Tables 5
and 6). We included an additional region (pre-response region) to check whether participants looked
at the object they chose. This region was defined as the 200 ms before response time in a given trial.
Graphs of target advantage again indicate a similar pattern across age groups (Figs. 5B and 6). Mixed 2
(Accuracy)  3 (Age Group) ANOVAs revealed a main effect of accuracy across Regions 3 to 5 and the
pre-response region (Region 3: gp2 = .240; Region 4: gp2 = .271; Region 5: gp2 = .224; pre-response:
gp2 = .118). Participants had a bigger target advantage in incorrect trials than in correct trials in Regions
3 to 5; conversely, they had a bigger target advantage in correct trials than in incorrect trials in the
pre-response region. No significant effects involving age group were observed (all ps > .30).
To summarize, analyses of eye movement data in the Director Experimental trials revealed clear
differences between correct and incorrect trials, but there was no significant effects involving age
group in any of the regions. In other words, there were no significant age-related differences in par-Please cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
lescence: An eye-tracking study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jecp.2015.11.007
Fig. 5. Target advantage scores (looks to the target minus looks to the distractor [or to the irrelevant object for control trials])
per condition over 50-ms time bins: (A) Director Control; (B) Director Experimental; (C) No-Director Control; (D) No-Director
Experimental.
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Fig. 6. Target advantage scores per condition over 50-ms time bins for incorrect Director Experimental trials.
Table 5
Mean target advantage scores (and standard errors) for correct and incorrect Director Experimental trials for each region.
Accuracy Region 3 ‘‘large” Region 4 ‘‘ball” Region 5 ‘‘up” Pre-response region
Child
Correct 0.00 (.04) 0.03 (.03) 0.01 (.06) 0.32 (.15)
Incorrect 0.10 (.04) 0.11 (.03) 0.13 (.09) 0.16 (.12)
Adolescent
Correct 0.03 (.02) 0.09 (.04) 0.14 (.05) 0.11 (.09)
Incorrect 0.17 (.05) 0.17 (.05) 0.19 (.06) 0.12 (.11)
Adult
Correct 0.00 (.04) 0.09 (.03) 0.07 (.08) 0.29 (.11)
Incorrect 0.27 (.06) 0.08 (.05) 0.18 (.11) 0.01 (.12)
Table 6
Omnibus repeated measures ANOVA F-values of target advantage for correct and incorrect Director Experimental trials in each
region.
df Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Pre-response
Omnibus ANOVA
Age group 2, 38 1.74 0.54 0.12 0.80
Accuracy 1, 38 23.68** 30.23** 22.06** 12.53**
Age Group  Accuracy 2, 38 1.03 1.02 0.87 0.70
** p < .01.
I. Symeonidou et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 13ticipants’ eye gaze patterns in both correct and incorrect Director Experimental trials. Furthermore,
the effect of accuracy observed in Regions 3 to 5 was reversed in the pre-response region, such that
participants initially showed a greater target advantage in the incorrect trials than in the correct trials,
and it was only right before they responded that they showed a greater target advantage in correct
trials than in incorrect trials.Discussion
In this study, we collected behavioral and eye-tracking data to investigate online use of ToM during
perspective taking in children, adolescents, and adults. Experimental trials of the Director task
required participants to take into account the director’s perspective to determine the intended refer-
ent in the instructions (e.g., ‘‘large ball”). The No-Director condition required participants to follow an
explicit avoidance rule to determine the correct referent. Whereas both the Director and No-DirectorPlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
lescence: An eye-tracking study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jecp.2015.11.007
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an inference about the speaker’s intentions given the speaker’s ignorance of certain objects
(Dumontheil et al., 2010).
The current study had three main objectives: (a) to replicate the behavioral findings of Dumontheil
and colleagues (2010), (b) to assess the role of inhibitory control in this task across age groups, and (c)
to compare the time course of information processing among children, adolescents, and adults
through eye-tracking in order to determine in what ways the deployment of ToM differs across age
groups.
Behavioral data
We found that in the Director Experimental condition, the child and adolescent groups performed
worse than the adult group, but participants’ accuracy did not differ across groups in the No-Director
Experimental condition. These results are in line with Dumontheil and colleagues (2010) findings and
provide further evidence for age-related differences between adolescents’ and adults’ tendency to take
someone else’s perspective into account. Conversely, response times decreased with age in all condi-
tions except in Director Experimental trials, which did not vary with age, and are again similar to those
observed by Dumontheil and colleagues.
Inhibitory control
We observed age-related differences in participants’ performance on both inhibitory control tasks.
In the Simple Go–NoGo task, the child group made significantly more errors and was significantly
slower than the adolescent and adult groups. These results are in line with previous studies suggesting
that with a low-level cognitive load inhibitory control performance reaches adult level performance
by approximately 14 years of age (Lamm, Zelazo, & Lewis, 2006; Leon-Carrion et al., 2004; Luna,
Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004). In the Complex Go–NoGo task, the child and adolescent
groups performed worse than the adult group. Because the Complex Go–NoGo task included a
1-back WM requirement, these results are also in line with studies investigating WM that found
age-related differences between adolescents and young adults (Conklin, Luciana, Hooper, & Yarger,
2007; Luna et al., 2004).
Association between inhibitory control tasks and Director task
What was novel in this study was the investigation of the relationship between the inhibitory con-
trol tasks and the Director task. The results show that inhibitory control as measured by Simple NoGo
accuracy accounted for some of the variance in accuracy difference between Director and No-Director
Experimental trials. Critically, inhibitory control accounted for only some of the variance due to age
given that age remained a significant predictor, suggesting that some additional factors are behind
age-related changes. These results are in line with a previous study by Vetter and colleagues
(2013), who found that 15% of the variance of affective ToM performance was uniquely explained
by age, indicating independent effects of age and inhibition.
Interestingly, no relationship was found between participants’ performance on the Complex Go–
NoGo task and the Director task. This is surprising because performance on the Complex Go–NoGo
task showed age-related differences between the adolescent and adult groups. This could be because
the Complex Go–NoGo task placed greater WM demands than the Director task. A study that explored
the relationship between WM and perspective taking (Lin et al., 2010) found that participants with
lower WM capacity performed more poorly on the Director task than participants with greater WM
capacity and that participants’ performance on the Director task was worse during high-WM load tri-
als than during low-WM load trials. However, Lin and colleagues’ (2010) study did not include a No-
Director condition with matched general executive function demands, whereas the current study used
the difference in accuracy between Director Experimental and No-Director Experimental trials as the
measure of interest. Future research might shed light on these differences in results by using separate
measures of WM and inhibition (Vetter et al., 2013).
A possible limitation for the interpretation of the behavioral results is the difference in verbal IQ
among age groups. However, the significant interactions with age observed in the Director task werePlease cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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multiple regression did not affect the results given that both the independent effects of age and Simple
NoGo accuracy remained significant.
Eye-tracking data
Through eye-tracking, we were able to investigate additional underlying factors in Director task
performance. Examining correct and incorrect trials separately indicated that adults, adolescents,
and children did not differ in their online processing of the task (Fig. 5). Analyses of Director Experi-
mental trials data showed opposite effects of accuracy in the earlier regions (Regions 3–5) and the pre-
response region, such that participants initially showed a greater target advantage in the incorrect tri-
als than in the correct trials. They showed a greater target advantage in correct trails than in incorrect
trials only right before they responded. These results seem inconsistent with the perspective adjust-
ment model (Keysar et al., 2000, 2003), according to which one would expect that on both the correct
and incorrect trials participants first attend to the distractor, the best-fit referent from an egocentric
perspective. On correct trials participants would adjust to considering the director’s perspective and
attend to the target, whereas on incorrect trials the second adjustment process would fail because
it is costly and participants would remain focused on the distractor. However, as is evident from
the incorrect trials for all age groups, participants appear to consider the target early on in the trial
and then, before responding, their eye gaze shifts to the distractor.
Based on the eye-tracking results, it seems that at the point where the director indicates which
object should be moved (Region 4), participants on correct trials are already on a path to correctly con-
sidering the director’s perspective. However, participants’ strategy seems to be to first look at the
objects that participants are not going to choose (or the objects they should not pick) as a process
of elimination before focusing on the object that they will ultimately choose. This pattern has not been
reported before. Other studies, such as Hanna and colleagues (2003), Heller and colleagues (2008), and
Barr (2008), showed that bias in participants’ eye gaze builds steadily toward the target after initial
interference from the distractor. What sets our study apart from these eye-tracking studies is the fact
that the distractor is the best fit for the description, making the task of ignoring the privileged object
particularly challenging. In addition, the description itself contains a relational modifier (e.g., ‘‘big,”
‘‘bottom”) that implicitly refers to a contrast set. Given these two factors, it should not be surprising
that participants adopt a strategy of checking all objects of the same type (e.g., all balls on the display)
to ensure that they choose the correct one. Our eye gaze data of Object 2 (e.g., the second commonly
viewable ball) suggests this also. It shows that prior to focusing on the object they chose, participants
paid similar attention to each of the other two objects they eliminated (see Figs. S3–S5 in supplemen-
tary material). The only other studies that used a setup similar to ours are those reported in Keysar and
colleagues (2000) and Wu and Keysar (2007). Neither of those articles reported eye gaze data in full,
but their results are consistent with ours in that they found more looks to the distractor overall and
first looks to the distractor were earlier than first looks to the target.
Adults, adolescents, and children in the current study seemed to follow a process of elimination
strategy in control trials as well, where only the two commonly viewable objects denoted by the noun
(e.g., ‘‘ball”) were present and only one fit the full description (‘‘large ball”). We propose that partic-
ipants focus first on the second object to exclude it before looking at the target (see Figs. S3–S6 in sup-
plementary material). Therefore, there may be a consistent strategy across all conditions, and all age
groups, of looking at the objects that are not going to be chosen prior to focusing on the object to be
chosen.
If we accept that participants adopt a process of elimination strategy, then our results suggest that
the eye gaze pattern on correct trials is influenced by the actual beliefs of the director early on, as we
see the pattern emerge in Region 4 when participants process the modifying adjective (‘‘large”). The
idea that eye gaze data reflect an influence of the speaker’s perspective at an early stage is in line with
a number of previous perspective-taking studies mentioned above (Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008;
Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008). The results are also consistent with Nadig and Sedivy’s
(2002) observation that 5- and 6-year-old children showed early sensitivity to a speaker’s perspective
in a much simplified director task. These articles proposed an alternative to the perspective adjust-Please cite this article in press as: Symeonidou, I., et al. Development of online use of theory of mind during ado-
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available to be integrated into referential decision processes from the outset. On this constraint-based
view, the extent to which mental perspective information is used depends on the extent to which
other constraints are conflicting and how salient or available the perspective information is
(Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; Samson et al., 2010). Hanna and colleagues (2003) argued that the
Director paradigm used in Keysar and colleagues (2000) and in this article makes conflicting cues
related to the linguistic form particularly strong because the occluded object (the distractor) is in fact
the best fit for the description. Other studies such as Brown-Schmidt (2009b) have suggested that
varying the strength (or quality) of cues to the speaker’s mental perspective can affect online referen-
tial processes. If varying cues to mental perspective can have an impact on ToM integration, it seems
plausible from this constraint-based perspective that individuals may differ in the extent to which
their referential processes exploit a given cue. Thus, an explanation of the age-related differences that
are not accounted for by inhibitory control may lie in differences in participants’ sensitivity of online
processes to mental perspective information. This is a hypothesis that requires further exploration.
If we assume that accuracy differences in our Director task are a product of varying abilities to inte-
grate perspective information in incremental referential processes, rather than at a later corrective
stage, then we can make sense of the reaction time results reported here and in Dumontheil and
colleagues (2010). These results showed shorter RTs in the Director task compared with the No-
Director task and also no RT difference in the Director condition between age groups. The observation
made about these results is that the Director task engages a more efficient or rapid process than sim-
ple explicit rule following and does so to the same extent across age groups.
Taken together, the current results provide evidence for age-related differences between adoles-
cents and adults in their online use of ToM. Contrary to perspective adjustment accounts of the Direc-
tor task, our results suggest that all age groups appear to engage in the same kind of online processes
during perspective taking but differ in how often mental state information informs incremental deci-
sion processes. Taking our results in the wider context of research into online use of ToM, we see one
possible source of the difference between age groups as being their sensitivity to available cues to
mental state information.
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